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Abstract
The recent focus on ‘pro-poor growth’ led also to an intense debate on how
exactly to deﬁne and to measure pro-poor growth. However, all suggested
measures, irrespective whether they use the absolute or the relative deﬁnition
of pro-poor growth have in common that they are based on the anonymity
axiom, i.e. they do not distinguish between changes in horizontal and vertical
inequality. That means usual assessments of pro-poor growth look at dis-
tributional changes over time and ignore how speciﬁc groups or households
moved. Such a perspective may provide a very incomplete picture given
that the common objective of most studies investigating the pro-poorness
of growth is to test whether speciﬁc policy reforms where beneﬁcial to the
initially poor or not. Using panel data from Indonesia and Peru, this pa-
per analyzes and illustrates empirically the implications of removing the
anonymity axiom from measurements of pro-poor growth. It is shown that
postulating anonymity, when assessing pro-poor growth can lead to mislead-
ing conclusions on how a speciﬁc policy aﬀected the incomes of the initially
poor. For both countries, the analysis shows substantial convergence to the
mean, which is, at least for the case of Indonesia, robust to measurement
error in the expenditure data.
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11 Introduction
The recent focus on ‘pro-poor growth’ in development economics and poli-
tics led also to an intense debate on how exactly to deﬁne and to measure
pro-poor growth (see e.g. Duclos and Wodon 2004; Klasen 2004; Ravallion
2004a). A key point in this debate is whether pro-poor growth should be
deﬁned in ‘absolute’ or in ‘relative’ terms of poverty reduction. According
to the absolute deﬁnition growth is considered as being pro-poor whenever
the incomes of the poor increase. In contrast, the relative deﬁnition requires
that the growth rate of income is higher among the poor than among the
non-poor, i.e. inequality must decrease. However, all suggested measures, ir-
respective whether they use the absolute or the relative deﬁnition of pro-poor
growth have in common that they are based on the anonymity axiom, i.e.
they do not distinguish between changes in horizontal and vertical poverty
and inequality. ‘Horizontal inequality’ refers to inequality between initially
‘equals’, i.e. individuals having had initially the same income (Plotnick
1982). ‘Vertical inequality’ refers to inequality between initially ‘unequals’,
i.e. inequality between diﬀerent income groups.
More precisely, usual assessments of pro-poor growth look at distribu-
tional changes over time and ignore how speciﬁc groups or households moved.
In other words, two distributions are treated as equally good if, after income
is redistributed among households, the overall distribution is the same. The
ways of how the observed distributions were obtained are deemed irrelevant.
However, such a perspective may provide a very incomplete picture. The
common objective of most studies investigating the pro-poorness of growth
is to test whether speciﬁc policy reforms where beneﬁcial to the poor or not.
More generally, to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of reforms one would like to
know which groups beneﬁted or lost and how much. Likewise, one would
like to know, if individuals under the poverty line before and after the re-
form are roughly the same and thus poverty is a rather chronic state, or, in
contrast, if mobility is high and poverty is rather a transient phenomenon.
Issues of chronic poverty and income mobility have recently received con-
siderable attention (e.g. Fields and Ok 1996; Hulme and Shepherd 2003),
however they have so far not been considered in the framework of pro-poor
growth. An exception is the study by Jenkins and Van Kerm (2003), but
they analyze the issue for the USA and Germany, and not in the context of
poverty reduction in the developing world.
The following example shows that these issues are of particular impor-
tance when assessing pro-poor growth. Take the simple case, where an in-
come distribution observed in t can be divided into two equal sized groups:
the ‘poor’ and the ‘rich’. Let us further assume that between t and t +1
the poor see their incomes increase to a level which is above the level of
the initially rich in t and the rich see their incomes decrease to a level
which corresponds exactly to the level of the initially poor in t.L o o k i n g
2only at marginal distributions we would judge such a growth pattern as not
pro-poor, both, according to the absolute and the relative deﬁnition. How-
ever, looking at the group-speciﬁc trajectories, this growth pattern could be
judged as being clearly pro-poor. This very simple example illustrates that
postulating anonymity, when assessing pro-poor growth may result mislead-
ing conclusions on how a speciﬁc policy aﬀected the incomes of the initially
poor. However, obviously a clear-cut answer whether such a growth process
can be called pro-poor or not cannot be given. It depends on the value judge-
ments one might want to accept. For instance, utilitarianism and the Pareto
principle may justify the unequal treatment of equals, but we may ﬁnd it
unfair that following a reform people at similar initial incomes are rewarded
very diﬀerently. Ravallion (2004b) pointed out that ‘anti-globalizers’ seem
to focus more on the losers amongst the poor and those vulnerable to poverty
and therefore on horizontal inequality, whereas ‘globalizers’ focus more on
aggregate inequality explaining why both groups may conclude so diﬀer-
ently on the distributional consequences of international trade. Moreover,
the Millennium Development Goal One, which requires to halve poverty by
half before 2015, clearly focuses on aggregate poverty.
The objective of this paper is to analyze and illustrate empirically the
implications of removing the anonymity axiom from measurements of pro-
poor growth. Given that the empirical distinction between horizontal and
vertical shifts in the income distribution requires not only information on
the marginal distributions of income under alternative policies, but also on
the joint distributions of income across these policy states, this paper will
also oﬀer a brief discussion of how such joint distributions can be recovered
when panel data is not available.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
some usual measurements of pro-poor growth and analyzes the implications
of postulating and removing the anonymity axiom. This section also oﬀers
various decompositions, which can help to understand more deeply distri-
butional changes in favor of the poor. Section 3 illustrates these problems
using panel data for Indonesia and Peru. Section 4 concludes and discusses
brieﬂy some methods for policy analysis allowing to remove the anonymity
axiom when panel data is not available.
2 The anonymity axiom and measurements of pro-
poor growth
2.1 The anonymity axiom
Assuming an income distribution over n individuals enjoying each an in-
come yi, anonymity postulates that all permutations of personal labels are
3regarded as distributionally equivalent, i.e.:
(y1,y 2,y 3,...,y n) ∼I (y2,y 1,y 3,...,y n) ∼I (y1,y 3,y 2,...,y n).
This axiom, sometimes also called ‘symmetry’, requires that the underlying
social welfare function uses only the information about the income variable
and not about, for example, some other characteristics which might be dis-
cernible in a sample or an enumeration of the population (Cowell 2000).
This assumption is usually invoked for welfare orderings, whether we look
at inequality (Atkinson 1970) or at poverty (Greer, Foster and Thorbecke
1984). However, this axiom is neither trivial nor self-evident, and for certain
purposes it could make sense to remove it.
2.2 Measurements of pro-poor growth
Various measures have been suggested to measure pro-poor growth.1 Ip i c k
up two of them: The ‘growth incidence curve’ and the ‘rate of pro-poor
growth’. Both were suggested by Ravallion and Chen (2003) and are widely
used in the empirical literature. They are relatively intuitive and therefore
convenient for illustrative purposes. First I analyze these measures for the
case where the anonymity axiom is postulated. Afterwards, I study their
properties when the anonymity axiom is removed.
2.2.1 Postulating anonymity
When comparing two income distributions observed in t−1a n dt,t h eg r o w t h





Letting p vary from p1 to pmax, gt(p) traces out what Ravallion and Chen
(2003) called the ‘growth incidence curve’ (GIC).2 Denoting γt the growth
rate in mean income, it is evident from Equation (1) that if the Lorenz
curve does not change then, gt(p)=γt for all p.C o n v e r s e l y ,gt(p) >γ t if
and only if the ratio of the income at p, y(p), and the mean income increases
between t − 1a n dt.I f gt(p) is a decreasing (increasing) function for all p
then inequality falls (rises) over time for all inequality measures satisfying
the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. If the GIC lies above zero everywhere
(gt(p) > 0 ∀ p) then there is ﬁrst-order dominance of the distribution at date
1See, for instance McCulloch and Baulch (2000), Kakwani, Khandker and Son (2003),
Kakwani and Pernia (2000), Ravallion and Chen (2003) and Klasen (2004).
2T h eg r o w t hr a t ei ni n c o m eo ft h epth quantile can equivalently be written using the
slopes of the Lorenz curves L
 (p)o b s e r v e di nt and t − 1 as well as the corresponding




t−1(p)(γt +1 )− 1 (Ravallion and Chen 2003).
4t over t−1. If the GIC switches sign then one cannot in general infer whether
higher-order dominance holds by looking at the GIC alone (Ravallion and
Chen 2003).
Using the concept of the GIC, Ravallion and Chen (2003) deﬁne the rate
of pro-poor growth (RPPG) as the area under the GIC up to the headcount
index, H, which gives the proportion of all individuals having an income







where P stands for the total number of quantiles. It can be shown that the
RPPG corresponds to a change over time in the Watts poverty index, W,
i.e. RPPG = −∆W.4 It is important to note that the RPPG is derived
from the mean of the growth rates at all percentiles up to the headcount
index, which is not the same as the growth rate of mean income of the
poor. RPPG collapses to the growth rate in the overall mean (γt)i fa l l
incomes grow at the same rate. In this case inequality remains constant.
Conversely if the mean of the growth rates at all percentiles exceeds the mean
growth rate, inequality decreases, in the opposite case, inequality increases.
Besides the anonymity axiom RPPGsatisﬁes the focus axiom (the measure
is invariant to income changes for the non-poor), the population invariance
axiom (adding a replication of a population to that same population has
no impact), the transfer axiom (inequality-reducing transfers amongst the
poor are poverty reducing), but not, as shown by Kakwani and Son (2002),
the monotonicity axiom (any income loss to the poor increases poverty),
because RPPGis measured by integrating up to the headcount index in the
initial period, i.e. in case poverty rose (declined) RPPGdoes not take into
account those positions, which increased (decreased) the headcount index
between t − 1a n dt.
2.2.2 Removing anonymity
So far it was (implicitly) assumed that we observe one income distribution
in t−1, (F(yi,t−1)) and one in t,( F(yj,t)), where i and j do not refer neces-
sarily to the same individuals or where at least no information is available
to follow individuals over time. Now, I assume explicitly that this informa-
tion is available and that it is possible to infer the joint income distribution
F(yi,t−1,y i,t) for a ﬁxed population, i.e. individuals cannot only be ordered
3Throughout the analysis I assume that there is no ambiguity about the poverty line.
It is deﬁned in absolute terms and remains constant in real terms over time.
4Where Wt =1 /P
pHt
p=1 log[z/yt(p)], or, in words, the Watts Index is the population
mean of the log of the ratio of the poverty line to censored income, where the latter is the
actual income for those below the poverty line and the poverty line for those above it.
5by their income level y, but also according to some other personal circum-
stances revealing their identity or membership to group Ωh,w h e r eh is a
criteria classifying individuals into up to i =1 ,...,N groups. For instance,
suppose we can order individuals, observed in t − 1a n dt, according to
the group membership Ωp(yt−1) deﬁned by the income quantile p(yt−1)t h e y
belonged to in t−1. This information allows to order individuals in ascend-
ing order according to their initial income quantile p(yt−1) and to compute
the quantile speciﬁc mean incomes and growth rates in income where each





As before, letting p vary from p1 to pmax, gt(p(yt−1)) traces out a GIC. To
distinguish this GIC from the one deﬁned by Ravallion and Chen (2003), I
denote it in what follows ‘IGIC’, for ‘Individual Growth Incidence Curve’.
As for the GIC, the IGIC is a horizontal line if gt(p(yt−1)) = γt for all
p(yt−1), i.e. the individuals in each quantile see their incomes grow with the
average growth rate. If gt(p(yt−1)) > 0( gt(p(yt−1)) < 0) for all p(yt−1), then
each group is richer (poorer) in t than in t−1. Conversely, gt(p(yt−1)) >γ t if
and only if the ratio of the income at p(yt−1) and the mean income increases
between t − 1a n dt. However using the concept of the IGIC it is not
true anymore that if gt(p(yt−1)) is a decreasing (increasing) function for
all p(yt−1) then inequality falls (rises) over time for all inequality measures
satisfying the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. This is because individuals
in t are not anymore ordered in ascending order of their income, i.e. going
along the quantiles p(yt−1) is not going along richer and richer individuals in
t. It might be that the initially rich end up poorer as the initially poor and
the initially poor end up richer as the initially rich. In this case the IGIC
would have an decreasing slope and the GIC a positive slope, i.e. inequality
would increase. The diﬀerence is that the GIC compares two distributions
quantile by quantile, whereas the IGIC reﬂects the transition between the
distributions observed in t−1a n dt, i.e. income growth and income mobility.
To evaluate such a change in the income distribution, one might apply some
kind of compensation criteria (e.g. Hicks 1939 or Kaldor 1939), i.e. such a
change is desirable if the ‘new rich’ could compensate the ‘new poor’ in a
way that every group Ωp(yt−1) is as least well of in t than t − 1 and at least
on group is better of in t than t−1. Things become really diﬃcult, when the
initially poor end up slightly poorer as the initially rich and the initially rich
poorer than the initially poor. Then even applying a kind of compensation
principle would mean—equal group sizes assumed—we have a welfare loss.
Obviously such considerations will quickly bring us back to the usual GIC
or, conversely, call for a more speciﬁc social welfare function. In Section 2.3
this issue will be analyzed in more detail using decomposition techniques.
To compute the RPPGfor the ICIC, IRPPGin what follows, we may
6integrate the area under the IGIC up to the headcount index of the initial
period, Ht−1. That means we integrate the growth of income for all those
individuals who had an income below or equal to the poverty line z in t−1.
More precisely, integrating over the IGIC, implies to integrate over the same
individuals in t − 1a n dt, independent whether they have still an income








Obviously, we may have individuals who had an income above z in t−1, but
who have one below z in t. These individuals would not enter the IRPPG
(similar to the failure of the RPPG to satisfy the monotonicity axiom).
Hence, computing IRPPG for the IGIC implies to focus on those initially
poor. This can be taken as a special variant of the above mentioned ‘focus
axiom’ and might be justiﬁed on Rawlsian grounds (Rawls 1971).
2.3 Decomposition of pro-poor growth
To understand the mobility process which separates the GIC and IGIC and
which is hidden if anonymity is postulated, changes in income distribution
and poverty can be decomposed in components measuring somehow general
income growth and components measuring somehow mobility across the in-
come distribution. This might also help to make value judgements about
speciﬁc distributional changes. I use three approaches here. The ﬁrst one
follows Ravallion and Lokshin (2004) and consists in decomposing changes
in the mean log deviation into changes in horizontal and vertical inequal-
ity. The second one follows Jenkins and Van Kerm (2003) and consists
in decomposing any measure of the generalized Gini class of indices in a
component summarizing mobility in the form of reranking and a compo-
nent summarizing progressivity in income growth. The third one is—to my
knowledge—new and consists in decomposing changes in poverty measured
by the FGT class of indices or the Watts index into components summariz-
ing up-ward mobility of the initially poor, income growth among the initially
poor and down-ward mobility of the initially non-poor.
2.3.1 Decomposition of inequality changes into horizontal and
vertical components
One can ﬁnd an intense debate in the literature on how to deﬁne and to
measure horizontal equity (see e.g. Auerbach and Hassett 2002; Duclos and
Lambert 2000; Jenkins and Lambert 1999; Kaplow 1989; Plotnick 1982).
The issue is in particular discussed in the literature on taxation. Among
other things, this debate turns around the question what one means by
‘equals’ and ‘treating equals equally’. Ravallion and Lokshin (2004) deﬁne
7as ‘equals’ those individuals with an initial equal income and regard two
equal individuals as treated equally if they beneﬁted both in the same way
of growth and redistribution, i.e. if their gain conditional on their initial
income is the same. More precisely, averaging across all individuals i the
absolute change in income, bi = yit−yit−1, one can calculate the conditional
mean impact given by:
bc
i = Ei(bi|y = yit−1). (5)
Deviations of the expected impact conditional on initial income create hori-
zontal inequality.
Using this deﬁnition any change in a decomposable inequality measure
can be decomposed in a vertical and horizontal component. Taking the
mean log deviation MLD=1 /n
n
i=1 ln(¯ y/yi), the following decomposition
can be made:

































where the ﬁrst term can be interpreted as the vertical component and the
second term as the horizontal component of the observed change in inequal-
ity. If ‘equals’, i.e. all individuals with the same initial income, receive the
same beneﬁt bi = bc
i the horizontal component is zero. Conversely, when the
relative expected beneﬁt for each household bc
i/yit−1 corresponds exactly to
the relative increase in the mean income ¯ b/¯ yt−1 the vertical component is
zero.
To empirical implementation of this approach requires to estimate the
expected impact Ei(bi|y = yit−1) (Equation 5) for each household. This
will be done—again following Ravallion and Lokshin (2004)—using a non-
parametric local regression method suggested by Cleveland (1979).
One may argue that period-income is only are very bad criteria to deﬁne
‘equals’ to measure horizontal inequality and it might be also interesting to
perform this decompositions by groups deﬁned according to their permanent
income, wealth or socio-economic status.
2.3.2 Decomposition of inequality changes into progressivity of
income growth and reranking
The second decomposition approach I use is based on the idea, that changes
in the income distribution over time can be additively decomposed into terms
representing the progressivity of income growth (P), i.e. whether income is
pro-poor rather than pro-rich and the extent of reranking (R). Jenkins and
8Van Kerm (2003) decompose in this way the Gini coeﬃcient, but they show
that this can be done for any member of the generalized Gini index:

































To compute G, R and P the N individuals are ordered in ascending order
according to their initial income yit−1. The indices it and it−1 stand not
only for the index of summation, but also for the rank of each household in
the income distribution observed in t − 1a n dt respectively.
Remember that the Gini coeﬃcient is a weighted average of each indi-
vidual’s relative income, yit/¯ yt, where the weight is given by the reversed
rank in the income distribution (N−it+1). Therefore R is a relative-income
weighted average of changes in ranks of individuals across the income dis-
tribution. Or, put diﬀerently, it can be interpreted as an index of mobility
in the form of reranking. Clearly, when there is no reranking R =0 . B y
contrast R takes its maximum value equal to 2×Gt when income ranks are
totally reversed, so that the poorest household in year t − 1i st h er i c h e s t
household in year t, the second poorest becomes the second richest, and
so on (Jenkins and Van Kerm 2003). Given the focus on ranks as social
weights, it is clear that this decomposition can only be done for this speciﬁc
class of inequality measures.
P is a rank or ‘social-weighted’ average of the changes in relative in-
come between years t−1a n dt and summarizes the progressivity of income
growth across the base year income distribution.5 When everyone experi-
ences equiproportionate income growth, relative incomes remain constant,
and P =0 .I fP>0 income growth is concentrated more among the poorer
individuals than the richer individuals, i.e. inequality tends to decrease and
growth is pro-poor in the relative sense. By contrast, if P<0i n c o m eg r o w t h
is concentrated more among the richer individuals than the poorer individ-
uals, i.e. inequality tends to increase and growth is not pro-poor in the
relative sense (but might be in the absolute sense). When aggregate income
growth is negative, γ<0, then income growth is pro-poor in the relative
5The decomposition could also be written in a form using the ranks (social weights) of
the ﬁnal income distribution.
9sense (not in the absolute sense) if the income looses are concentrated more
among the richer individuals. P is bounded by Gt−1 − 1( w h e nt h er i c h e s t
household in t−1 obtains all the income in year t)a n dGt−1 +1 (when the
poorest household in year t − 1 obtains all the income in year t). Hence
Equation (7) states that inequality is reduced by progressive income growth
unless more than oﬀset by concomitant income mobility (Jenkins and Van
Kerm 2003).
2.3.3 Decomposition of poverty changes into income growth, up-
ward and down-ward mobility
The third decomposition approach I use consists in decomposing changes in
poverty measured by the FGT class of indices (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke
1984) into components summarizing up-ward mobility of the initially poor,
income growth among the initially poor and down-ward mobility of the
initially non-poor. Hence, taking the FGT poverty indicators and deﬁning
the following set of 0/1 indicator variables:
ξi = 1 if the individual i was poor in t − 1a n dt (stayer),
πi = 1 if the individual i was poor in t − 1 and non-poor t (mover),
ψi = 1 if the individual i was non-poor in t − 1a n dp o o rt (joiner),



















with α>0a n dz the in real terms time-invariant poverty line. α =0y i e l d s
the headcount index, i.e. the proportion of poor individuals, and α =1t h e
poverty gap ratio, i.e. the average distance of the poor to the poverty line,
where for the non-poor this distance is set to zero.












































where the ﬁrst component gives the change in poverty, which is due to the
up-ward mobility of those individuals who where poor in t−1 and non-poor
10in t (movers) while for those remaining under the poverty line (stayers)
income is kept at the initial level of t − 1. The second component gives
the change in poverty, which is due to changes in income among the stayers
(or chronic poor). The third component gives the change in poverty, which
is due to the down-ward mobility and income contraction of individuals
who where initially non-poor (joiners). If the headcount index (FGT0), i.e.
α = 0, is retained as poverty indicator, the second component is of course
zero.
An completely equivalent decomposition can be performed with the
Watts index, which has a direct link to the GIC, because its negative change
corresponds to the RPPG(see Section 2.2.1).
3 An empirical illustration for Indonesia and Peru
3.1 Data
To illustrate the implications of removing the anonymity axiom of measure-
ments of pro-poor growth, I use longitudinal data for Indonesia and Peru.
For Indonesia, I use all three existing waves of the Indonesian Family
Life Survey conducted by RAND, UCLA and the University of Indonesia’s
Demographic Institute in 1993 (IFLS1), 1997 (IFLS2) and 2000 (IFLS3).
The IFLS is an ongoing longitudinal socioeconomic and health survey. It
is representative of 83% of the Indonesian population living in 13 of the
nation’s current 26 provinces. The IFLS is judged as having a very high
quality, among other things, because individuals who moved are tracked
to their new location and, where possible, interviewed there. Hence, this
procedure ensured that the re-contact rate in the IFLS3 was 95.3% of IFLS1
households. Hence, nearly 91% of IFLS1 households are complete panel
households.6 Using the three waves, I built two panels, one from 1993 to
1997 (6,723 households; 31,324 individuals) and one from 1997 to 2000 (7,187
households; 32,314 individuals).7 I use real household expenditure per capita
as the welfare measure, or income measure in what follows. Expenditure is
expressed in 1993 prices and adjusted by regional price deﬂators to the
Jakarta price level.
For Peru I use the ﬁrst (ENAHO1, 1997) and third wave (ENAHO3,
1999) of the Peruvian Encuesta Nacional de Hogares conducted by the In-
stituto Nacional de Estad´ istica e Inform´ atica. The ENAHO is an ongoing
longitudinal living standard measurement survey. It is representative for the
three rural and four urban areas of Peru. The ‘panel-households’ are only a
sub-sample of all households interviewed. In total 3,027 households (14,948
6For details see Strauss, Beegle, Sikoki et al. (2004).
7The number of households is higher in the second period, because it includes so called
‘split-oﬀ’ households, i.e. individuals covered by the IFLS1, but who left their initial
household and formed their own new household.
11individuals) have been followed over the the ﬁrst three waves. De Vreyer,
Mespl´ e-Somps and Herrera (2002) have shown that there seems to be no
signiﬁcant attrition bias. Attrition could be a problem if the fourth wave
(2000) were used, because of a substantial drop out of many panel house-
holds. Therefore, I use the third instead of the fourth wave. I use again
real household expenditure per capita as the income measure. Expenditure
is expressed in 1997 prices and adjusted by regional price deﬂators to the
Lima price level.
3.2 An assessment of pro-poor growth with and without pos-
tulating the anonymity axiom
In Indonesia during the ﬁrst period covered by the IFLS data—1993 to
1997—real GDP per capita increased by almost 5 percent per year. Table
1 shows, as one can expect, that household incomes increased and poverty
could be signiﬁcantly reduced. This very favorable dynamic was abruptly
stopped by the economic crisis which started to be felt in the South-East
Asia region in April 1997. However the major impact did not hit Indonesia
until December 1997/January 1998, just after IFLS2 was conducted. Then,
in 1998 , GDP per capita declined almost by 12 percent. The sustained crisis
period continued in Indonesia more than a year.8 Yet in 2000, when IFLS3
was conducted, the population had—beneﬁting from the pre-crisis positive
dynamic—returned to roughly its pre-crisis living standard, and as Table 1
shows, with some people even a little better oﬀ.
[insert Table 1]
A look at the usual (cross-section) GICs (the ﬁgures on the left hand
side of Figures 1 and 2), which postulate anonymity, show that growth was
in both sub-periods positive over the whole income distribution and thus
according to the absolute deﬁnition ‘pro-poor’. During the period 1993
to 1997 the GIC indicates that growth rates up to the 80th percentile of
the income distribution were even higher than the average growth rate and
thus growth was also ‘pro-poor’ according to the relative deﬁnition. In
consequence inequality decreased (see Table 1). This was, except in the
ﬁrst ten percentiles, not the case during the period 1997 to 2000. This
can also easily be seen by the fact that during the ﬁrst period the mean of
percentile growth rates was above the growth rate in mean, whereas it was
below the growth rate in mean during the second period. Table 2 shows the
rates of pro-poor growth, RPPG, for both periods and alternative poverty
lines. The rates computed under the anonymity axiom (1st and 2nd column)
consistently suggest that between 1993 and 1997 growth was highly pro-poor
for both poverty lines used and between 1997 and 2000 only ‘moderately’
8For details, see e.g. Strauss, Beegle, Dwijanto et al. (2002).
12pro-poor if the 25 percent poverty line is retained and even negative (or
‘anti-poor’) if the 50 percent poverty line is retained.
[insert Table 2, Figures 1–2]
However, these growth incidence curves completely hide the mobility
of individuals and households across the income distribution. They oﬀer
only a comparison of marginal distributions and are compatible with various
movements of poor and non-poor individuals over time. For instance, one
might want to know whether those individuals being poor after the crisis are
the same individuals than those being poor before the crisis. Put diﬀerently,
did post-crisis policies and reforms only help a few poor to escape poverty,
or, instead, were these measures very favorable for the poor and helped
many of them to improve substantially their living standard, but did in the
same time hurt the richer households and pushed some of them below the
poverty line? In other words, was growth between 1997 and 2000 really not
particularly pro-poor, or was instead mobility very intense, moving many
poor out of poverty while pushing others into it? The usual pro-poor growth
assessment does not allow to distinguish between both phenomena. From
a political point of view, this might of course be crucial. In the ﬁrst case
further policies are needed to attack chronic poverty (e.g. investment in the
productivity of the poor). In the second case, poverty seems to be more a
transient phenomenon, and policies providing safety nets might be the right
response.
To answer these questions, I now turn to the IGICs, i.e. to the growth
incidence curves, where growth rates for percentiles containing the same in-
dividuals in both years are considered. Looking ﬁrst at the curve for the
period 1993 to 1997 (Figure 1, RHS), one can state that the pattern of
the IGIC is even ‘more’ pro-poor than that of the GIC, indicating strong
(unconditional) convergence or what is sometimes called ‘regression to the
mean’. A look at the other IGICS (Figures 2-5), shows that this ‘regression
to the mean’ can be observed more or less for all spells considered. Mea-
surement error might of course be a problem here and be responsible for
the observed convergence. However, this problem should, at least partly, be
under control, given that the data was trimmed (see Appendix), but it will
be addressed in more detail below.
That means with respect to the period 1993 to 1997 the GIC hides the
high mobility of individuals over the income distribution and the fact that
particularly the initially poor beneﬁted from income growth. This can also
be seen when computing the mean growth rate for the 50 percent initially
poor (IRPPG), which is 16.4 percent instead of the obtained 1.8 percent,
when simply the mean growth rate for the lower 50 percent of the income
distribution is computed (Table 2). However, in this case both curves show
at least qualitatively the same thing: pro-poor growth in the absolute as
well as in the relative sense.
13The decomposition results presented in Table 3, can describe in more
detail the mobility across the income distribution and help to understand
how the drawn GIC and IGIC arose. For instance, if the change in inequal-
ity (measured by the mean log deviation (MLD)) is decomposed into the
formation of horizontal inequality, i.e. inequality between initially ‘equals’
and vertical inequality, i.e. inequality between initially ‘unequals’, one can
state, that heterogeneity in growth rates for initially equals would have
risen the MLD by more than 15 points, but this increase in inequality was
over-compensated by a signiﬁcant reduction in inequality between initially
unequals (-19 points), i.e. a narrowing of the income distribution. Fur-
thermore, looking at the second decomposition, we state that ‘reranking’
of individuals over the income distribution alone would have risen inequal-
ity as measured by the Gini coeﬃcient by more than 18 points. However,
this was over-compensated by ‘pro-poor growth’ in the relative sense, i.e.
higher growth rates among the poor, indicated by the positive value of the
‘progressivity-component’ P of 21 points (which has to be deduced from
the reranking component to obtain the total change in inequality). Finally,
the decompositions of poverty measures (the 50 percent poverty line is used
here) show that the change in the headcount index—the proportion of indi-
viduals poor—can be explained by a reduction of 27 points due to ‘leavers’
and an increase of 7 points due to ‘joiners’. Or, if the poverty gap ratio is
decomposed, one can state that ‘leavers’ reduced the average distance to the
poverty line in relation to the poverty line by almost 9 points, income growth
of those staying in poverty reduced it by further 3 points and, in contrast,
‘joiners’ increased it by only 1.6 points. In consequence, the GIC in Figure 1
(LHS) is the result of signiﬁcant upward mobility and clearly higher growth
rates among the poor which reduced also the average gap to the poverty
line of those who stayed under the poverty line. This was only slightly be
compensated by downward mobility of initially non-poor individuals, and,
as a result, vertical inequality decreased.
[insert Tables 3–5]
Making the comparison of the GIC and IGIC for the period 1997-2000,
one can state that whereas the GIC is U-shaped, suggesting that for the
very poor and the very rich growth was higher than growth in mean, the
IGIC has a clear negative slope (again suggesting regression to the mean)
and, in contrast to the GIC, growth in mean is signiﬁcantly below the mean
of percentile growth rates. Therefore in this case, whether we postulate or
remove the anonymity axiom clearly matters for our conclusion on how the
‘poor’ beneﬁted from growth. This shows also up when computing rates of
pro-poor growth (see Table 2). The corresponding rates of pro-poor growth
are almost zero for the GIC, but again very high when computed for the
IGIC.
14Both curves are even more contrasting if they are drawn solely for the ur-
ban sample. Whereas postulating anonymity leads to a GIC (Figure 3, LHS)
which is clearly anti-poor in the relative sense and only weakly pro-poor in
the absolute sense (from the 30th to the 45th percentile), the IGIC (Figure
3, RHS) is clearly pro poor, i.e. growth rates are positive up to the 70th per-
centile and higher than the growth rate in mean up to the 65th percentile.
That means, if we remove the anonymity axiom and consider individual tra-
jectories through time, we get exactly the opposite GIC compared to the
case where we do the usual cross-section comparison. Whereas for the GIC
the growth rate in mean lies above the mean of percentile growth rates, the
opposite is the case for the IGIC. Likewise the rates of pro-poor growth
computed for both poverty lines are negative for the GIC, but signiﬁcantly
positive for the IGIC (Table 2).
[insert Figures 2–3]
Again, the decompositions can help to understand what exactly hap-
pened to the income distribution and the poor. First one can state that the
rise in horizontal inequality was almost exactly oﬀset by the reduction in
vertical inequality and likewise that inequality through reranking was com-
pletely oﬀset by higher income growth among the poor (P>0). Moreover,
the decomposition of the change of the poverty gap ratio shows that incomes
from ‘stayers’ stagnated and the reduction in the mean poverty gap due to
‘leavers’ was again exactly compensated by ‘joiners’ having fallen under the
poverty line. Hence, whereas the GIC suggests, that the poor did bene-
ﬁt underproportionally from growth, the decomposition shows that almost
30 percent of the poor left poverty, but that this eﬀect was however not
reinforced through income growth among ‘stayers’ and even partly oﬀ-set
through individuals falling under the poverty line. Of course more speciﬁc
value judgments have to be formulated to decide whether such a growth
process should be called ‘pro-poor’ or not.
Now we turn to the Peruvian case. In the nineties Peru had to face sub-
stantial institutional reforms and several macro-economic shocks. Among
other things the country was adversely aﬀected by the economic crisis in
South-East Asia and EL Ni˜ no. From 1997 on macro-economic growth slowed
down and became even negative in 1998 and 1999.9 Table 1 shows that real
household income per capita, poverty and inequality remained more or less
constant during that period. However, the comparison of the GIC with the
IGIC will again show that this ‘cross-sectional’ stability hides interesting
dynamics.
Whereas the GIC (Figure 4, LHS) shows positive growth only for the
poorest ﬁve percentiles and between the 15th and the 25th percentile and
negative growth for all others, the IGIC (Figure 4, RHS) indicates positive
9For details see e.g. Herrera and Roubaud (2003).
15growth rates up to the 75th percentile. As for Indonesia, the slope of the
IGIC is clearly negative, indicating higher growth rates for the poor and
thus again convergence. Likewise, whereas the mean of percentile growth
rates lies below the growth rate in mean for the GIC, it lies not only above
the growth rate in mean for the IGIC, but is also positive (about 5 percent).
This contrast is even more pronounced if rural areas are considered alone
(see Figure 5). On the national level as well as for rural areas, the RPPGs
are close to zero or even negative, whereas the IRPPGs are clearly positive
(Table 2).
[insert Figures 4–5]
As for Indonesia in 1997 to 2000, horizontal inequality is almost exactly
compensated by a decline of vertical inequality. Likewise, higher inequality
due to reranking is one to one oﬀset by the progressivity component, i.e.
higher growth rates among the poor. The more or less constancy of the
headcount index for the 50 percent poverty line, hides a reduction by 11
points due to ‘leavers’ and an increase by 12 points due to ‘joiners’. Decom-
posing changes in the poverty gap ratio, yields that ‘leavers’ reduced this
poverty measure by almost 3 points, but that this impact was completely
over compensated by ‘joiners’ which increased it by more than 3.1 points.
Income growth for the chronic poor was very weak and contributed almost
nothing to poverty reduction.
3.3 Robustness to measurement error
The above results are all based on a sample of expenditures declared by
households (‘income’ in what follows). Apparent outliers have been with-
drawn from the sample using the Mahalanobis distance measure (see Ap-
pendix). However, it is evident that the remaining declarations are still,
more or less, aﬀected by measurement error. When drawing the usual GIC,
the measurement error is less a problem given that we only compare marginal
income distributions. However, the problem can be more serious, when
drawing the IGIC, which is based on a joint income distribution, even if
the problem is reduced due to the fact that growth rates are—as for the
GIC—computed over percentiles and not over individuals directly. In this
sub-section, I will analyze the robustness of the—in more or less all cases
stated—negative slope of the IGICs to the existence of measurement error.
To do this, I mainly follow the approach suggested by Fields, Cichello, Freije
et al. (2003).
It is assumed that the income reported by household i in year t is given by
the sum of unobserved true income Y ∗
it and a measurement error component
µit:
Yit = Y ∗
it + µit, (10)
16where µit may be correlated with true income. Following Fields et al. (2003)
it is assumed that measurement error in the initial period t − 1 is a linear
function of true income, plus a white-noise disturbance term, ut−1.I f t h e
average true income in the initial period is denoted as ¯ Y ∗
t−1 and δt−1 repre-
sents the correlation between true base year income and measurement error,
measurement error in the initial year reported income can be written as:
µit−1 = δt−1(Y ∗
it−1 − ¯ Y ∗
t−1)+uit−1. (11)
Given that measurement error might be correlated over time, a serial cor-
relation coeﬃcient ρ is deﬁned. Measurement error in the ﬁnal period can
then be written as:
µit = δt(Y ∗
it − ¯ Y ∗
t )+ρuit−1 + uit. (12)
The relationship between households’ income in the initial period and their
subsequent income change, when income is measured without error, is the
coeﬃcient from a regression of true income change on true initial income.
This coeﬃcient measures the extent of convergence or divergence in true
income and can be expressed as:
β∗ =
Cov[Y ∗






The OLS estimate from a regression of reported income change on reported
base year income is denoted:
β =
Cov[Yt − Yt−1,Y t−1]
Var[Yt−1]
. (14)
A ss h o w ni nF i e l d set al. (2003), Equations (10) through (14) now yield:
β = β∗Var[Y ∗
t−1]
Var[Yt−1]







(1 + δt−1)(δt − δt−1). (15)
To give these three terms an interpretation, two additional assumptions have
to be made according to Fields et al. (2003). First, a particular household’s
propensity to misreport income is assumed to decline or remain constant
over time, such that ρ ≤ 1. Second, measurement error is assumed partially
correlated with true income, such that δt−1 and δt are both > −1. Both
assumptions are consistent with empirical evidence (see Bound, Brown and
Mathiowetz 2001).
Under these assumptions, the second term of Equation (15) indicates
that the measurement error in initial income contributes to an apparent neg-
ative correlation between base-year income and subsequent income change.
17This is due to the fact that the measurement error of the initial period
enters of course also the computed income change. However, this bias is
partly oﬀset if measurement errors are serially correlated. The ﬁrst term of
Equation (15) corresponds to the standard attenuation bias caused by the
stochastic independent variable. This attenuation bias is aggravated if mea-
surement error is negatively correlated with true income in each period. As
Fields et al. (2003) emphasize, this attenuation bias counteracts the eﬀects
of the second term by raising the value of β towards zero, whenever the true
relationship between initial income and income change is negative, i.e. un-
der convergence. Finally, the third term will be relatively small, unless the
correlation coeﬃcient between measurement error and true income changed
substantially between periods.





β∗(1 + δt−1)(1 + δt)+( 1+δt−1)(δt − δt−1) − β(1 + δt−1)2
1 − ρ + β
, (16)
which gives the variance of stochastic measurement error, relative to the vari-
ance of true income, given the observed regression coeﬃcient on reported
income β and a particular value of the unknown coeﬃcient on true income,
β∗. Setting β∗ equal to zero can then give the minimum amount of mea-
surement error required to overturn the negative relationship between initial
income and income change.
Table 6 shows the OLS estimates of β, when for each of the ﬁve spells
analyzed above, (Yit−Yit−1) is regressed on Yit−1 (without controlling for any
other variables, i.e. test of unconditional convergence). Moreover, Table 6
reports the minimum threshold for each spell, which is computed for diﬀerent
combinations of ρ and the δs( a si nF i e l d set al. (2003), it is assumed that
δt−1 and δt are equal). The chosen parameters ρ and δ correspond to the
lower and upper bounds found in various validation studies on earnings
declarations summarized in Bound et al. (2001). The correlation coeﬃcient
between measurement error and true earnings usually seems to lie between
-0.05 and -0.4. A reasonable range for serial correlation goes according
to these studies from 0.1 to 0.2. These orders of magnitude are derived
from declarations on annual earnings and do not necessarily apply to the
expenditure data used in this study, but should however, given the wide
range of parameters tested, serve as reasonable bounds.
[insert Table 6]
In Indonesia, for divergence to have taken place, the variance of mea-
surement error would need to be at least 75 to 670 percent of the variance of
18true incomes, depending on the correlation between measurement error and
both true income and past measurement error. In Peru, measurement error
with a variance that ranges from 28 to 125 percent of true income could
already be responsible for the observed estimates of convergence. Bound
et al. (2001) report for the ratio of the variance of measurement error to
the variance of true income a usual range of 0.1 to 0.3. That means that
the observed convergence to the mean and the resulting negatively sloped
IGICS can be considered as highly robust against measurement error for
the case of Indonesia. However, for the case of Peru, it cannot not be ex-
cluded with certainty that measurement error is responsible for the observed
convergence.
However, it should be noted that ‘mean-reversion’ (β<0) is not suf-
ﬁcient but only necessary to prove convergence, under some circumstances
the rate of convergence is even independent of the degree of mean-reversion.
Put diﬀerently mean-reversion and convergence are, as shown by Lichten-
berg (1994), not completely equivalent. But given that in in both countries,
Indonesia and Peru, inequality does not substantially rise and for some spells
even decrease, the mean reversion should also imply convergence.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The assessment of pro-poor growth for Indonesia and Peru with and without
postulating the anonymity axiom, has shown that postulating anonymity,
that is considering the usual cross-sectional growth incidence curves, com-
pletely hides the mobility of individuals across the income distribution and
therefore, cannot say much on how exactly a particular growth incidence
curve arose. The shape of almost all growth incidence curves constructed
using the panel dimension of the data, thus removing anonymity, shows that
growth for the initially poor was generally stronger than the usual cross-
section growth incidence curve suggested. Put diﬀerently, almost each spell
considered indicated substantial up-ward mobility suggesting convergence to
t h em e a n .I nt h es a m et i m et h ed e c o m p o s i t i o no fp o v e r t yc h a n g e ss h o w e d
that (except in Indonesia 1993-1997) a part of the population seems however
to be stuck in poverty and to beneﬁt not at all from economic growth (the
‘pro-poor growth component’ is close to zero). In other words, cross-section
data cannot be used to track the experience of a particular set of individuals
over time, but only to track income groups, whose composition may change.
This explains how it can be possible both for ‘the poor’ to fare badly rela-
tively to ‘the rich’ (constant or increasing poverty measures despite growth
in mean income) and for income growth to be ‘pro-poor’ (up-ward mobility
of initially poor). An extreme case was presented for urban Indonesia for
the period 1997 to 2000, where removing anonymity results in an exactly
reversed growth incidence curve. It was shown that all these ﬁndings are
19robust against the inﬂuence of measurement error in the case of Indonesia
but however not necessarily in the case of Peru.
In any case, the analysis shows that a judgement about the extent of the
pro-poorness of growth based on the usual cross-section growth incidence
curve can give a biased impression on how the initially poor beneﬁted or
not from growth. In consequence, when postulating anonymity and inter-
preting growth incidence curves, one should be aware and very explicit on
what exactly is measured. To be clear, the objective is not to question the
utility of cross-section comparisons of income distributions, but to highlight
that they should be complemented by some kind of longitudinal analysis
to understand the sources of poverty reduction and inequality, and the in-
equality and mobility consequences of policies more deeply, i.e. who were
the losers and winners of speciﬁc reforms. Of course, removing anonymity
makes necessary some value judgements on how one weights income mobility
vs. changes of cross-section inequality and poverty, i.e. to what extent the
initial position of individuals should matter for our judgement about ﬁnal
outcomes of a policy.
Unfortunately, in most cases, especially for developing countries, we do
not have panel data at hand and it seems that then we are forced to postu-
late anonymity when comparing income distributions over time. A solution
to this problem can be to rely on micro-simulation methods or some kind of
counterfactual analysis. Micro-simulation became recently quite popular in
development economics due to the PRSP Initiative10 and the resulting need
to evaluate income distributional consequences of macro-economic shocks
and policy reforms. The principle of this methodology is to estimate, mostly
econometrically, some kind of income model yi = Y (xi,  i;β;σ;λ)/P(ci;p),
where real household income per capita, yi,o fh o u s e h o l di is assumed to
depend on six sets of arguments: its observable socio-demographic charac-
teristics, or those of its members (xi), unobservable characteristics ( i), a
vector of remuneration rates of the observed (β) and unobserved earnings
determinants (σ), and a set of parameters deﬁning the participation and
occupational choice behavior of its members (λt). P stands for a household
speciﬁc price deﬂator being a function of the household’s budget shares ci
and a vector of commodity prices p. This model is then used to simulate
counterfactual incomes ˜ yi by varying in accord with historical observations
or some speciﬁc policy reform either one or several of the variables and/or
one or several of the parameters. Finally, this allows to analyze the joint
distribution F(yi, ˜ yi). For a detailed description of this kind of methodol-
ogy see e.g. Bourguignon and Ferreira (2003) and Cogneau, Grimm and
Robilliard (2003).
The only limited use of comparing marginal distributions when evaluat-
ing speciﬁc policies was recently also highlighted by Cunha, Heckman and
10‘PRSP’ stands for Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.
20Navarro (2004).11 They suggested a similar methodology to that described
above allowing to recover the joint distribution F(y0,y 1) if for each individ-
ual depending on her ‘treatment’, s =0o rs =1 ,o n l yy0 or y1 is observed.
The principle of this methodology is to analyze econometrically choice data
using a factor structure model in order to construct for each individual the
counterfactual income ˜ y0 if s =1a n d ˜ y1 if s = 0. Once the whole coun-
terfactual income distribution is recovered a social mobility analysis can be
undertaken.
Obviously, these methodologies are more time intensive than simple in-
come distribution analyses. However, they have the advantage that they
can also solve the usual problem inherent in ‘before-after-comparisons’ by
isolating what distributional change is due to a speciﬁc shock or policy and
what is due to other changes. Thus, these methodologies eventually allow
to go also beyond to what can be done with panel data analysis.
Appendix: Elimination of outliers
To eliminate the inﬂuence of outliers the data were trimmed. I use a similar
method to that used by Jenkins and Van Kerm (2003). For each pair of years
analyzed, I discarded an observation if the Mahalanobis distance between
its two log per capita income values (yit−1,yit) exceeded a critical value
equal to the mean plus two times the standard deviation of the distribution
of the Mahalanobis distances in the two-year sample. The vector of the
household’s Mahalanobis distances for each pair of years can be computed
by the following equation:
MD=
	




where y is a N × 2 matrix containing the two vectors of incomes of both
years, m is a 1 × 2 matrix containing the mean incomes of both years, and
S is the 2×2 variance-covariance matrix of the two income vectors. Income
is in logarithmic terms and expressed on a per capita basis.
The advantage of using this concept is that the Mahalanobis distance
identiﬁes not only outlier incomes in each year but also outlier changes in
income between years. Applying this concept, between 4 and 5 percent of the
observations in each two-year sample were—besides some few observations,
were not any information at all on expenditures was available—excluded.
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Growth, poverty and inequality
Initial Final
Indonesia, 1993–1997, national
Growth in mean p.y. 0.079
FGT0 (25% pline.) 0.250 0.100
FGT1 (25% pline.) 0.072 0.023
FGT0 (50% pline.) 0.500 0.297
FGT1 (50% pline.) 0.185 0.086
Gini-Coeﬀ. 0.400 0.376
Indonesia, 1997–2000, national
Growth in mean p.y. 0.019
FGT0 (25% pline.) 0.250 0.228
FGT1 (25% pline.) 0.069 0.058
FGT0 (50% pline.) 0.500 0.473
FGT1 (50% pline.) 0.173 0.158
Gini-Coeﬀ. 0.363 0.367
Indonesia, 1997–2000, urban only
Growth in mean p.y. 0.011
FGT0 (25% pline.) 0.250 0.252
FGT1 (25% pline.) 0.067 0.070
FGT0 (50% pline.) 0.500 0.502
FGT1 (50% pline.) 0.177 0.179
Gini-Coeﬀ. 0.354 0.372
Peru, 1997–1999, national
Growth in mean p.y. -0.008
FGT0 (25% pline.) 0.250 0.247
FGT1 (25% pline.) 0.071 0.069
FGT0 (50% pline.) 0.500 0.514
FGT1 (50% pline.) 0.191 0.194
Gini-Coeﬀ. 0.367 0.366
Peru, 1997–1999, rural only
Growth in mean p.y. -0.009
FGT0 (25% pline.) 0.250 0.256
FGT1 (25% pline.) 0.054 0.056
FGT0 (50% pline.) 0.500 0.507
FGT1 (50% pline.) 0.161 0.167
Gini-Coeﬀ. 0.325 0.327
Notes: FGT0 refers to the headcount index, i.e. the percentage of poor individuals.
FGT1 refers to the poverty gap ratio, i.e. the average distance between income and the
poverty line (where for non-poor households this distance is set to zero) as a fraction of
the poverty line. Two poverty lines are used: the ﬁrst considers the ﬁrst 25 percent (25%
pline.) and the other considers the ﬁrst 50 percent (50% pline.) at the bottom of the
income distribution in each base year as poor.
Source: IFLS1, IFLS2, IFLS3, ENAHO1, ENAHO3; computations by the author.
25Table 2
Rates of pro-poor growth
with and without postulating anonymity
25% pline. 50% pline.
anonymity no anonym. anonymity no anonym.
(RPPG)( IRPPG)( RPPG)( IRPPG)
Indo., 1993–1997, national 0.023 0.229 0.018 0.164
Indo., 1997–2000, national 0.007 0.200 -0.002 0.131
Indo., 1997–2000, urban -0.007 0.167 -0.003 0.126
Peru, 1997–1999, national 0.007 0.200 -0.002 0.131
Peru, 1997–1999, rural -0.002 0.224 -0.006 0.138
Notes: The rates of pro-poor growth are computed for two alternative poverty lines: the
ﬁrst considers the ﬁrst 25 percent (25% pline.) and the other considers the ﬁrst 50 percent
(50% pline.) at the bottom of the income distribution in each base year as poor.
Source: IFLS1, IFLS2, IFLS3, ENAHO1, ENAHO3; computations by the author.
Table 3
Decomposition of changes in inequality
in changes in horizontal and vertical inequality
Mean log deviation Decomposition
Initial Final Change Horizontal Vertical
Indo., 1993–1997, national 0.268 0.235 -0.033 0.157 -0.190
Indo., 1997–2000, national 0.219 0.221 0.003 0.145 -0.143
Indo., 1997–2000, urban 0.207 0.230 0.023 0.145 -0.122
Peru, 1997–1999, national 0.226 0.222 -0.003 0.100 -0.103
Peru, 1997–1999, rural 0.170 0.172 0.001 0.118 -0.116
Source: IFLS1, IFLS2, IFLS3, ENAHO1, ENAHO3; computations by the author.
Table 4
Decomposition of changes in inequality in changes
due to reranking and changes due to pro-poor growth
Gini-coeﬃcient Decomposition
Initial Final Change Reran. Pro-p. growth
Indo., 1993–1997, national 0.400 0.376 -0.024 0.185 0.210
Indo., 1997–2000, national 0.363 0.367 0.005 0.178 0.174
Indo., 1997–2000, urban 0.354 0.372 0.019 0.182 0.163
Peru, 1997–1999, national 0.367 0.366 -0.001 0.100 0.101
Peru, 1997–1999, rural 0.325 0.327 0.001 0.124 0.123
Source: IFLS1, IFLS2, IFLS3, ENAHO1, ENAHO3; computations by the author.
26Table 5
Decomposition of changes in poverty
in mobility and pro-poor growth components
FGT0 (50% pline.) Decomposition
Initial Final Change Out-mob. Pro-p. growth In-mob.
Indo., 1993–1997, national 0.500 0.297 -0.202 -0.270 0 0.067
Indo., 1997–2000, national 0.500 0.473 -0.028 -0.158 0 0.131
Indo., 1997–2000, urban 0.500 0.502 0.003 -0.138 0 0.140
Peru, 1997–1999, national 0.500 0.514 0.014 -0.106 0 0.120
Peru, 1997–1999, rural 0.500 0.507 0.008 -0.131 0 0.138
FGT1 (50% pline.) Decomposition
Initial Final Change Out-mob. Pro-p. growth In-mob.
Indo., 1993–1997, national 0.185 0.086 -0.099 -0.087 -0.029 0.016
Indo., 1997–2000, national 0.173 0.158 -0.016 -0.045 -0.059 0.036
Indo., 1997–2000, urban 0.177 0.178 0.001 -0.036 0.001 0.037
Peru, 1997–1999, national 0.191 0.194 0.003 -0.026 -0.001 0.031
Peru, 1997–1999, rural 0.161 0.167 0.005 -0.036 0.004 0.038
Watts (50% pline.) Decomposition
Initial Final Change Out-mob. Pro-p. growth In-mob.
Indo., 1993–1997, national 0.266 0.115 -0.151 -0.120 -0.053 0.021
Indo., 1997–2000, national 0.243 0.216 -0.027 -0.061 -0.012 0.047
Indo., 1997–2000, urban 0.247 0.251 0.004 -0.047 0.003 0.048
Peru, 1997–1999, national 0.273 0.275 0.002 -0.034 0.003 0.040
Peru, 1997–1999, rural 0.215 0.221 0.006 -0.047 0.004 0.049
Notes: The used poverty line (50% line) refers to the poverty line which considers the ﬁrst
50 percent at the bottom of the income distribution in each base year as poor.
Source: IFLS1, IFLS2, IFLS3, ENAHO1, ENAHO3; computations by the author.
27Table 6
Ratio of measurement error to true income variance
implying zero correlation between true initial income and true income change
Indonesia Peru
1993-1997, nat. 1997-2000, nat. 1997-2000, urb. 1997-1999, nat. 1997-1999, rur.
δρ β = −0.684 β = −0.686 β = −0.696 β = −0.442 β = −0.441
0 0 2.165 2.185 2.289 0.792 0.789
0 0.1 3.167 3.206 3.412 0.965 0.961
0 0.2 5.897 6.018 6.692 1.235 1.228
-0.1 0 1.753 1.770 1.854 0.642 0.639
-0.1 0.1 2.565 2.597 2.764 0.782 0.778
-0.1 0.2 4.776 4.874 5.421 1.000 0.995
-0.2 0 1.385 1.398 1.465 0.507 0.505
-0.2 0.1 2.027 2.052 2.184 0.618 0.615
-0.2 0.2 3.774 3.851 4.283 0.790 0.786
-0.4 0 0.779 0.786 0.824 0.285 0.284
-0.4 0.1 1.140 1.154 1.228 0.347 0.346
-0.4 0.2 2.123 2.166 2.409 0.444 0.442
Source: Computations by the author.
Figure 1
Growth incidence curves: Indonesia, 1993–1997, national
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Mean of percentile growth rates
Indonesia, 1993−1997 (panel)
Notes: Curves are smoothed by three period running medians.
Source: IFLS1, IFLS2, IFLS3; computations by the author.
28Figure 2
Growth incidence curves: Indonesia, 1997–2000, national
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Indonesia, 1997−2000 (panel)
Notes: Curves are smoothed by three period running medians.
Source: IFLS1, IFLS2, IFLS3; computations by the author.
Figure 3
Growth incidence curves: Indonesia, 1997–2000, urban
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Indonesia, 1997−2000 (panel)
Notes: Curves are smoothed by three period running medians.
Source: IFLS1, IFLS2, IFLS3; computations by the author.
29Figure 4
Growth incidence curves: Peru, 1997–1999, national
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Peru, 1997−1999 (panel)
Notes: Curves are smoothed by three period running medians.
Source: ENAHO1, ENAHO3; computations by the author.
Figure 5
Growth incidence curves: Peru, 1997–1999, rural
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Peru, 1997−1999 (panel)
Notes: Curves are smoothed by three period running medians.
Source: ENAHO1, ENAHO3; computations by the author.
30